Newsroom Law Blog : Media & Communications Lawyer & Attorney : Brooks Pierce Law Firm : Media Law, Libel Defense, FCC

It’s the pivotal moment in countless episodes of Law & Order and CSI.  You know the scene by heart, no doubt.

Detectives approach the intrepid reporter asking for some video or information about where the reporter got a piece of information.  The reluctant reporter puts up initial resistance, saying something like, “That is confidential.”  Detectives quickly respond that they will get a subpoena if they "have to," and, if they do, “we’ll come back in a bad mood.”  Detectives leave with information in hand.

Such confrontations are key to wrapping up a case in forty-eight minutes or less, but every reporter should know that while these scenes may be “ripped from the headlines,” any resemblance to the actual law is purely coincidental.  Of course while the law might be fictional, the factual scenario is all too common, at both the federal level and the state level.

In other posts to this blog, we provide reporters and editors with a broad overview of the law of subpoenas, including, of course, some concrete steps that you should take when your local Detective Briscoe shows up asking for some videotape or photographs, an interview transcript, or the identity of a source.

Today’s topic . . . what exactly is a subpoena?

The fancy legal term is “Subpoena Duces Tecum,” which is just the Latin way of saying that a court is requiring you to appear at a designated time and place with some specified documents.  A subpoena may require you or someone in your newsroom to appear in court, before a grand jury, or in an attorney's office to testify under oath.  In some cases, it will simply request some particular document or material (like handwritten notes or videotape footage).

If the subpoena pertains to a matter in state court, the state rules of procedure dictate what must be in the subpoena and how you may respond to it.  In North Carolina, for example, Rule 45 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure will govern, whether the subpoena is issued in connection with a civil or criminal proceeding.  If the subpoena relates to a matter pending in federal court, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply.  We discuss the differences between state and federal subpoenas in more detail in another post.  It is important to recognize that with very limited exceptions (such as grand jury subpoenas), a subpoena cannot be issued unless there is a pending civil or criminal proceeding.  In other words, a law enforcement officer, district attorney, or private attorney generally cannot issue a subpoena as part of an investigation that has not ripened into an actual lawsuit or arrest.

Most often, someone—either a sheriff or a professional process server—will appear at your newsroom with subpoena in hand and give it to you personally (i.e. “serve” you).  It is possible in North Carolina to serve a subpoena by registered or certified mail, but personal service by a sheriff or process server is still common.  It is unlikely that a detective investigating a criminal matter would show up at your office with a subpoena in hand.

Though the actual appearance of the subpoena will be different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, no matter where you are it should have a few key things:

• The words “Subpoena” or “Subpoena Duces Tecum” at the top
• Your name and address
• The date you are required to appear
• The place you are required to appear
• What you must bring with you
• The person making the request, along with contact information
• The signature of the person issuing the subpoena—either the clerk of court, a judge or magistrate, or an attorney

A regular letter, no matter how strongly worded, is not a subpoena.  Once you are sure you have been served with a subpoena, however, the most important thing to know is that this is not a polite request.  You cannot ignore the subpoena and hope it will go away—you should always contact legal counsel when you receive a subpoena.  Assistance of counsel is important because there are legal steps you may be able to take to quash or limit the subpoena, as we discuss in other posts.
 

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High-profile criminal investigations and trials frequently set the stage for conflict between the news media, law enforcement agencies, and criminal defendants.  While law enforcement reasonably wishes to preserve its ability to successfully investigate and prosecute the case, the media reasonably desires to engage in constitutionally protected newsgathering activities and inform the community about those activities.  Of course, the criminally accused want to protect their constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.  One of the issues over which the media, law enforcement, and criminal defendants may disagree is access to search warrants materials—when access should be granted, how much access should be granted, and the procedures that must be followed if access is denied.  Indeed, there have been a number of conflicts involving search warrants over the past few months—the Eve Carson investigation is just one recent highly publicized example.

Access to search warrant applications, returns, and supporting materials (such as affidavits) implicates the First Amendment as well as state law.  The United States Supreme Court held in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia that the First Amendment grants the public and the press a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials.  And, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court held that this First Amendment right also applies to pretrial proceedings in criminal cases.  However, there is some disagreement among jurisdictions about whether there is a First Amendment-based right of access to search warrant materials. 

The Eighth Circuit recognized a First Amendment right of access to search warrants in In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn (Gunn I).  In Gunn I, the Eighth Circuit framed the test for overcoming the First Amendment right and the procedures to be followed in this way:

The party seeking closure or sealing must show that such a restriction of the first amendment right of public access is necessitated by a compelling government interest. If the district court decides to close a proceeding or seal certain documents, it must explain why closure or sealing was necessary and why less restrictive alternatives were not appropriate. The district court’s findings must be specific enough to enable the appellate court to determine whether its decision was proper; if the district court decides that a restriction of the first amendment right of public access is warranted, the district court can even file its statement of reasons and specific findings under seal. (Citations omitted.)

Other jurisdictions, including the Fourth Circuit, have not recognized a constitutional right.  But even in these jurisdictions, some right of access generally does exist. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989), recognized a qualified common law right of access, holding that a judicial officer may only deny access to search warrant materials “when sealing is ‘essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'”  The standard for sealing search warrants under the common law in the Fourth Circuit is very nearly the same as the First Amendment standard articulated in Gunn I.

As the Eighth Circuit did in Gunn I, the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun imposed procedural requirements on judges issuing orders to seal search warrant materials.  The public has a right to notice of a sealing order and an opportunity to voice objections.  Moreover, the court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the public interest in openness versus closure and the tailoring of the sealing order sufficient to allow for appellate review of the sealing order—“conclusory assertions are insufficient; specificity is required.”

The struggle between the public right to know, law enforcement’s interest in preserving its investigation, and the criminally accused’s right to a fair trial played out recently in the Eve Carson case, which gained national attention when the UNC student body president was killed in March 2008.  Law enforcement requested orders sealing search warrant applications, returns, and other supporting documents in order to protect their ongoing investigation and to protect the safety of confidential informants.  When law enforcement would not release the search warrant materials two weeks after two people had been indicted for Carson’s murder, the Durham Herald-Sun newspaper initiated proceedings to obtain access.  In evaluating the Herald-Sun’s motion to intervene and unseal the search warrants, the judge in the case applied the Baltimore Sun test and initially denied access in order to allow law enforcement additional time to complete the investigation.  The judge’s orders are provided here and here.

When the matter came up for hearing a second time, nearly two months later, the court granted the Herald-Sun’s motion to unseal the search warrant materials over the objections of one of the defendants who raised concerns about alleged dangerous pre-trial publicity.  The unsealing orders are provided here and here.

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The Supreme Court of Florida yesterday issued two opinions holding that Florida law does not recognize the false light invasion of privacy tort.  These outcomes constitute significant wins for media defendants in a state where the existence of false light as a viable state-law claim has been hotly debated. 

Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. involved statements made by the plaintiff’s stepson in a newsletter that suggested the plaintiff had joined or was a believer in the Jews for Jesus philosophy.  Essentially, the plaintiff argued in the underlying proceedings that, while literally true, the statements created a false impression of her, and she brought claims for false light invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the statements.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s position following a thorough comparison of the elements of and interests at stake in false light and defamation claims.

We once again acknowledge that it is our duty to ensure the “protection of the individual in the enjoyment of all of his inherent and essential rights and to afford a legal remedy for their invasion.” However, because the benefit of recognizing the tort, which only offers a distinct remedy in relatively few unique situations, is outweighed by the danger of unreasonably impeding constitutionally protected speech, we decline to recognize a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy.

On the same day it released Rapp, the Supreme Court of Florida also released Anderson v. Gannett. Like Rapp, Anderson involved false light invasion of privacy and defamation claims based on the same set of facts.  The question before the court in Anderson was the applicable statute of limitations for false light claims, but the court dismissed the question as moot given its holding in Rapp.

False light is one of the four branches of the common-law invasion of privacy tort.  In states that recognize false light as viable claim, a plaintiff must generally show that a defendant disseminated some highly offensive false publicity about an identified person with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement.  The elements are derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 652(E).

With these two decisions, Florida joins a number of other states in rejecting false light as a permissible state-law claim.

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With two weeks left in a hotly contested election season, the airwaves and newspapers are jammed full of political ads supporting (or attacking) one candidate or another.  These ads make for great political fodder, but they can also present knotty issues for broadcasters and newspapers to consider in deciding what to run and what not to run, especially as the ads become more negative in the late days of the campaign.

With negativity comes the possibility of defamation liability, especially when the target of the negative ad ends up losing the election.  While broadcasters enjoy immunity from liability for ads sponsored by candidates for state or federal office, there is no such protection for so-called "issue" ads sponsored by persons other than candidates, by political parties or by third-party interest groups.  Newspapers have no such immunity at all.  This means for political ads other than candidate ads broadcast over the air, broadcasters and newspapers are potentially on the hook for defamatory statements contained in the ads they run.

Generally speaking, as the California Supreme Court has said, “short of accusations of crime or personal dishonesty, the First Amendment protects even sharp attacks on the character, motives, or moral qualifications” of a public official, which includes candidates for elective office.  But political ads don’t always stop short of those kinds of accusations.  In fact, ads linking a candidate, either directly or implicitly, to illegal activity or to political corruption are not uncommon.

The first thing to remember is that if an accusation contained in an ad is true, you cannot be liable for defamation.  So when you are asked to place such an ad, ask for backup that supports the statements accusing the candidate of illegal activity or corruption.  Also be mindful that any person or company mentioned in the ad other than the candidates themselves may be a potential defamation plaintiff.  Ask for backup as to any potentially defamatory statements made about them as well.  (Public officials will also have to show that you acted with a high degree of fault in airing the advertisement--the famous "actual malice" standard--but that is the subject for another post).

It may well be the case that statements made in an aggressive ad are neither clearly true nor demonstrably false, such as “Senator X is the most corrupt politician in the legislature.”  Is the proper response, “Corruption is an opinion, and since I (or someone) truly hold (or holds) that opinion, it cannot be a false statement.”  Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court foreclosed that argument in the case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal.  The Court held: “If a speaker says, ‘In my opinion John Jones is a liar,’ he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.”  That implication is enough to support liability for defamation.

As for the underlying charge of corruption or illegality, the rule in almost every jurisdiction in the country is that a false statement that accuses someone of committing a crime or that “tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her trade, business or profession” is libel per se.  So, for example, when one candidate for mayor of a town in New Jersey distributed flyers that said that his opponent’s “corruption will bring increase in 1990 taxes,” the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the statement was defamatory.  In that case, however, there was clear evidence that the deal in question was not illegal or corrupt because a state investigative commission had cleared the mayor of any wrongdoing.  Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a libel verdict against a talk show host who had repeatedly accused a judge of being corrupt because the evidence at trial showed those statements to be verifiably false.

The rub is that an implicit accusation of "corruption" may be hard to prove true or false.  The question you have to answer, then, is how close to the line you want to walk as a news operation.  The simplest rule to follow is the more directly an ad accuses someone of corruption or illegal activity, the more concrete evidence supporting that accusation you should require before running the ad.  The stakes are too high to be less careful—the judge in the Texas case above was initially awarded compensatory and punitive damages totaling $8 million.
 

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The FCC today issued an order finding a broadcaster apparently liable for a $4,000 fine for broadcasting telephone conversations without giving prior notice of its intention to do so.   This order provides some important lessons for reporters who may want to incorporate actual telephone conversations into their broadcast packages.

Television and radio stations, as FCC licensees, are subject to a rule prohibiting the broadcast of telephone conversations without prior notice.  Section 73.1206 provides:

Before recording a telephone conversation for broadcast, or broadcasting such a conversation simultaneously with its occurrence, a licensee shall inform any party to the call of the licensee’s intention to broadcast the conversation, except where such party is aware, or may be presumed to be aware from the circumstances of the conversation, that it is being or likely will be broadcast.

In finding the broadcaster liable for a fine under this rule, the FCC rejected the station's argument that the notice requirement embodied in the rule could be disregarded because the person recorded was a public official.

Although this rule is most commonly implicated by radio on-air personalities who broadcast telephone conversations with listeners who call in, it may affect reporters as well.  If, as part of your news story, you want to include all or a portion of a telephone conversation you had with a source, you must be sure to inform your source that you may broadcast the conversation before you begin recording.  Thus, it would violate the rule to start recording without the source's knowledge and then, once you obtain a quote you would like to use in your story, belatedly ask the source for permission to broadcast the conversation.

It is important to recognize that this rule applies only to telephone conversations.  It does not affect your ability to broadcast surreptitious recordings of in-person conversations, for example as part of investigative pieces.  Your ability to make or use those recordings will be governed by state and federal wiretapping statutes, as well as the common law of invasion of privacy.  Thus, while it may well be that in certain states a reporter will be within his or her rights to record a telephone conversation without the consent of the other party to the conversation, the reporter may may not broadcast the recording over the air.

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A reporter’s or newsroom's best bet to quash an otherwise valid subpoena to appear in a state proceeding is a state shield statute (such as North Carolina).  If, however, the subpoena was issued at the federal law, such as from a United States Attorney or a fed era grand jury, or if you are in a state that lacks a shield statute (such as Texas), then your only choice is to rely on the muddled outcome of a thirty-six-year-old United Supreme Court precedent.  Despite its age, the value of this case to reporters remains uncertain.

In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court held 5-4 that reporters served with a grand jury subpoena in a criminal matter do not have a First Amendment privilege against testifying.

Branzburg actually decided three different cases, each of which involved a similar set of facts.  In one of the cases, a reporter in Kentucky had published an investigative piece on the local drug trade in which he had personally observed people producing and using illegal drugs.  The other two cases involved reporters who had been covering the activities of the Black Panther Party.  In all three cases, local law enforcement officials who were pursuing criminal investigations sought to compel the reporters to reveal their confidential sources to a grand jury.

Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, accepted the reporters’ argument that if journalists are regularly forced to disclose the identity of their confidential sources, those sources will soon dry up and the reporters will be unable to do their job.  The question, Justice White said, is whether this potential burden on the rights of the press outweighs the legitimate needs of law enforcement officials to investigate and prosecute crimes. In the end, White said:

[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.

In the end, White said, reporters remain regular citizens and must comply with a legitimate subpoena just as any other citizen.

Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion that reporters have used in both state and federal courts to argue that the Constitution in fact gives qualified protection, even though Justice White perhaps did not intend recognize such protection.  Justice Powell made clear in his opinion that despite the majority holding, law enforcement officials do not have a carte blanche “to annex the news media as an investigative arm of government.”  The critical passage of his opinion reads as follows:

If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith he is not without remedy.  Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationship without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.  The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.  The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

Branzburg is often described as a “4-1-4” case, meaning that there were four votes on either side of the issue, with one vote straddled both sides.  Justice Powell’s concurrence is the “1” here, and it is his call for a careful balancing by courts that would open the door in later years to some courts finding a qualified privilege in Branzburg.

The form of that privilege—adopted by many state legislatures in shield laws—was outlined in Justice Stewart’s dissent.  He wrote that, contrary to the majority opinion, the First Amendment demanded greater scrutiny of government attempts to compel reporters’ testimony.  Justice Stewart outlined a three-part analysis:

Governmental officials must, therefore, demonstrate that the information sought is clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry.  They must demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the witness in question has that information.  And they must show that there is not any means of obtaining the information less destructive of First Amendment liberties.

In one form or another, this three-part showing forms the basis of many shield statutes that provide a qualified privilege to reporters, thereby giving them some protection from compelled disclosure of confidential (and in some cases non-confidential) sources and source material.  In addition, it is the foundation of the proposed federal shield statute that is making its way, s-l-o-w-l-y, through Congress.

In recent years, several federal courts have refused to find a federal constitutional privilege in Branzburg, which calls into question just how much protection that case offers.  In two high-profile cases in the District of Columbia, federal district court judges ordered reporters to disclose confidential sources relating to the Valerie Plame leak investigation and a civil lawsuit brought by Wen Ho Lee.  These decisions were upheld on appeal.  In addition, a federal district court in San Francisco ordered reporters to disclose their source in connection with the BALCO investigation.  The Reporters Committee has cataloged recent federal subpoenas that gave rise to court challenges.

The lesson of these cases is that a reporter cannot count on protection--even qualified protection--from a federal subpoena that seeks the identity of a confidential source or other source materials.  This makes the passage of a federal shield law all the more critical.

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The U.S. Supreme Court case of Branzburg v. Hayes offers reporters limited constitutional protection from subpoenas compelling the disclosure of confidential sources or other source material.  The limitations of Branzburg and the lack of a federal shield law to complement state statutes first came into public consciousness in 2004 with the well-publicized Valerie Plame case. The effort to compel testimony from various Washington reporters about their contacts with White House officials was just one in what some perceived as a marked increase in the number of subpoenas served on journalists.

In response, a federal shield law—called the Free Flow of Information Act— was introduced in Congress in 2005. That act, like many state shield statutes, provides a qualified privilege for reporters that can only be overcome if the federal entity seeking disclosure can show that (1) there is no other reasonable way to get the sought-after information; (2) the information is “essential” to the case; (3) that nondisclosure of the information would be contrary to the public interest, taking into account both the public interest in compelling disclosure and the public interest in gathering news and maintaining the free flow of information; and (4) that:

(A) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to prevent imminent and actual harm to national security with the objective to prevent such harm;
(B) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to prevent imminent death or significant bodily harm with the objective to prevent such death or harm, respectively; or
(C) disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary to identify a person who has disclosed:
(i) a trade secret of significant value in violation of a State or Federal law;
(ii) individually identifiable health information . . . in violation of Federal law; or
(iii) nonpublic personal information . . . of any consumer in violation of Federal law.

The act also requires that the compelled disclosure be narrowly tailored and as limited as possible.

The Free Flow of Information Act passed the House in October 2007 but a slightly different version of has been stalled in the Senate ever since. Despite overwhelming support in the House and the Senate Judiciary Committee, it is unclear when, if ever, the Senate will move forward on the bill. It should also be noted that since the increase in federal subpoenas in 2003 and 2004, the number issued in 2005 and 2006 has decreased significantly. In 2006, for example, only three federal subpoenas were issued to reporters, as compared to nineteen in 2004.
 

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Although North Carolina does not recognize certain invasion of privacy claims recognized in some states, its courts have adopted the claim of invasion of privacy by intrusion. Unlawful intrusion is:

an intentional physical or sensory interference with, or prying into, a person’s solitude or seclusion or his private affairs, where the intrusion is highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.

Examples of conduct that North Carolina courts have found constituted unlawful intrusion include physically invading a person’s home or private place, eavesdropping by wiretapping or microphone, peering through windows or doors and persistent telephoning. Potential liability for intrusion may therefore place some limits how far journalists go in reporting a story or attempting to interview a source.

A person may not maintain an intrusion claim if he or she consents, at the time of the alleged intrusion, to being photographed, recorded or videotaped. Thus, the failure to obtain consent, when combined with surreptitious recording at a private location, may expose reporters to liability.

For example, one case involved a reporter who arrived at the subject’s house with no prior notice, and, when an adult answered the front door, the reporter began asking him questions. During the interview, the reporter wore a hidden microphone in his necktie, while a cameraman and sound technician hid in a van across the street. The subject had not agreed to be interviewed in advance and at no time during the interview did he consent to being recorded. On these facts, a federal appeals court in California concluded that the subject could maintain an intrusion claim.

The law in North Carolina does not expressly require parental consent to interview a minor in a public forum or to publish or air a minor’s image in connection with a news story. However, even if a minor consents to being interviewed at their home, a reporter is not necessarily protected from liability for intrusion. For example, in a case out of California a television film crew appeared unannounced at the front door of a private residence. Two young children, ages five and seven, answered the door and purportedly consented to being interviewed after the news crew informed them that their friends had just been murdered by their friends’ mother. The court ruled that the children, because of their young age, lacked the capacity to consent to the news crew’s presence on the private property, and, therefore, did not consent to the subsequent interview.

In addition to being mindful of potential intrusion claims and issues of consent, journalists and editors should also be aware that courts generally consider public school property to be a “non-public forum.” This designation means that the federal Constitution will permit reasonable local or state regulations that restrict media access to school property or that otherwise restrict newsgathering activities on school property, so long are those regulations are designed to lessen interference with normal school activities. These permissible restrictions may even extend beyond school grounds, so long as they apply to a school-sponsored activity such as a sporting event, a field trip or a graduation ceremony. More information about access to public school property is available in from The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and from David M. Herszenhorn.
 

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Jurisdiction is one of many issues that has become increasingly complicated in a world of web-based communications. Courts across the country have wrestled with the question of where a person who posts content on the Internet about another may be sued. Some litigants have argued that since the Internet may be accessed anywhere in the world, a person who places content on the Internet does so at the peril of being sued anywhere. Such approach would risk chilling Internet speech as bloggers and blog hosts may find themselves sued in far-flung locales, as potential plaintiffs troll the country shopping for the most favorable venue.

As a result, most courts have rejected this expansive view of Internet jurisdiction as inconsistent with the federal Constitution’s due process protections. In a decision issued June 17, 2008, the North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the stricter test, one first articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a federal court that is based in Richmond, Virginia and includes Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. This recent case involved a Georgia resident who posted messages on an Internet bulletin board about a North Carolina resident and businessman. The North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that this alone was insufficient to subject the out-of-state poster to the jurisdiction of North Carolina’s courts. The posts, which the plaintiff contended were false and defamatory, were made by a Georgia resident while in Georgia.

In reaching this decision, the North Carolina court applied the following test: did the defendant, through the Internet posts at issue, “manifest an intent to target and focus on North Carolina readers?” The court therefore rejected the plaintiff’s theory that the Georgia resident was subject to jurisdiction in North Carolina simply because he engaged in electronic activity accessible in North Carolina about a North Carolina resident that would affect the plaintiff’s reputation in North Carolina. Instead, something more than an Internet posting and accessibility in North Carolina is required—the plaintiff must show that the speaker targeted or focused upon a North Carolina audience. Because the plaintiff had not met this standard, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

This case is significant because it is an example of an appellate court continuing to grapple with adapting pre-Internet doctrines to an Internet-based world. With this decision, North Carolina joined other jurisdictions in holding that something more than a mere impact felt in North Carolina was required to subject an out-of-state Internet poster to jurisdiction here. What is the upshot for news directors in North Carolina? This decision affirms that you may be hailed to court in any state to which you direct your Internet content, which may or may not be coextensive with your broadcast radius. If you target readers outside your home state with your Internet content generally, or with a particular story or blog thread, you need to satisfy yourself that you do not face liability under that state’s law.
 

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We are pleased to launch Brooks Pierce’s Newsroom Law Blog, a blog focused on legal issues facing broadcast and print newsrooms. We look forward to providing regular content as a resource to journalists and editors working in newsrooms, as well as to legal professionals who advise media clients and academics who teach and study media issues.  The content we provide will range across the wide spectrum of legal issues that arise in the newsroom, from subpoenas to search warrants, from libel to invasion of privacy to trespass, from courtroom access to access to public records, from Internet issues to political advertising.

We will post to this blog a steady diet of primers and how-to pieces covering these topics.  We will make timely posts on hot topics, as legal opinions touching upon newsroom issues are released or as legislative decisions are made.  The breadth of topics we cover will be nationwide in scope, and we will also closely follow developments in North Carolina law and the law of neighboring states.  We hope you will find our blog not only a source for the most up-to-date information on newsroom law, but also plumb our archives for information on whatever topic is of interest to you. Please use the comments feature of this blog to share with us your thoughts and ideas for how to better serve our audience.

The contributors to this blog comprise Brooks Pierce’s newsroom practice, which includes Mark Prak, Charles Coble, Charles Marshall, Elizabeth Spainhour and Eric David.  You can learn more about our firm's practice at our firm’s website.

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