Internet Company Enjoined from Streaming Broadcast Programming over the Internet

Earlier today, the federal district court in the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting ivi.tv from streaming the programming of the plaintiffs' television stations over the Internet or to mobile phones. The plaintiffs include television stations in New York and Seattle, the major television networks, major television studios, and Major League Baseball.

ivi.tv began live Internet streaming of the programming of television stations located in New York and Seattle on September 13, 2010, to subscribers located anywhere in the United States for a fee of $4.99/month. ivi claimed that it could do so because it was a "cable system" under the Copyright Act. ivi, however, claimed that it was not a "cable system" for purposes of the Communications Act and, therefore, did not need to obtain the retransmission consent of the affected stations.

The court concluded that it is "extraordinarily unlikely that ivi will ultimately be deemed a cable system" under the Copyright Act since ivi neither fit the traditional type of localized delivery systems that are entitled to rely on the statutory license nor agreed to be abide by the FCC's governing rules.

The court entered the following preliminary injunction:

Thus, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is granted and it is hereby ORDERED that defendants . . . and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this injunction by personal service or otherwise, are hereby ENJOINED from infringing by any means, directly or indirectly, any of plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under Section 106 (1) - (5) of the Copyright Act, including but not limited to through the streaming over mobile telephone systems and/or the Internet of any of the broadcast television programming in which any plaintiff owns a copyright.

The court's ruling remains operative during the pendency of the lawsuit.

Charlotte Observer Draws Fire for Records Request

The Charlotte Observer was recently on the receiving end of a wave of criticism in response to public records requests it made to local government bodies in the Charlotte area.  The criticism did not stem from what it asked for per se, but rather who did the asking and why.  

As reported by Julie Rose of WFAE in Charlotte, the newspaper compiled tens of thousands of private email addresses by making public record requests of the City of Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, and other localities, seeking the addresses of those who had signed up for local government email updates.  Such email updates could, for example, include notifications from cities as to when official meetings had been scheduled.  An example of one of the newspaper's requests (to the Town of Davidson, North Carolina) is linked here.

As you can see from the link, the person who made the request on behalf of the Charlotte Observer was not a reporter but rather its "Director of Strategic Products and Audience Development."  This led the City of Charlotte to notify its employees of the request, which then prompted much hue and cry, with many leveling the accusation that the newspaper was using the Public Records Act to obtain information for marketing and commercial purposes.  

However, according to the newspaper's editor, the purpose of the request was not commercial in nature.  He indicated the newspaper intended to use the information to ask persons via email "if they would like to occasionally advise us on how we're reporting and what they would like to know more from their government and more about their community."  The newspaper subsequently backed away from that statement and pledged not to use the email addresses, based in part on the outcry voiced on its website and other blogs.  Other negative commentary can be found here and here.

Of course, who was doing the asking and why have no legal consequence whatever under North Carolina's Public Records Act.  The Act specifically provides that the requester cannot be required to disclose the purpose of a request.  And if a list of email addresses is a public record -- and it is if the public body made or received the list in the course of conducting public business -- then it does not matter whether the Charlotte Observer, Duke Energy, or Jane Q. Public asks to inspect a copy of the list.

These legal conclusions, however, are entirely distinct from the reality that what is a public record today may not be tomorrow -- the General Assembly can both giveth and taketh away, and it has created new exceptions to the Act in the past when some particular circumstance or court decision motivated it to do so.  So while the Charlotte Observer was no doubt within its rights to make the requests it made, that does not mean it was a good idea to do so, especially when you take into account the axiom that every action in the public records world can lead to an equal and opposite reaction from the legislative pen.

Despite the Charlotte Observer's pledge, the N.C. League of Municipalities still lists the following as one of its legislative goals for this term:

Seek legislation to protect the privacy of municipal residents by limiting public access to lists of email addresses submitted by citizens to municipalities.

We'll keep you posted on this and other legislative battles over the Public Records Act in North Carolina this year.

"Sunshine Amendment" Introduced in North Carolina

A bill introduced this week in the North Carolina General Assembly would enshrine the value of government transparency into North Carolina's Constitution.  North Carolina, like many states, provides citizens with a statutory basis for inspecting government records through its Public Records Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 132-1 and for attending official meetings of public bodies through its Open Meetings Law, N.C. Gen. Stat. 143-318.9.  However, the commitment to public access embodied in these laws is undermined by their numerous exceptions, such as exceptions in the Public Records Act for public employee records that are expansive by national standards.

House Bill 87, sponsored by Representatives Tim Moore and Stephen LaRoque, would set an important marker on this issue and help to stem the tide of efforts to chip away at access to government records and meetings by layering exceptions upon exceptions.  The amendment would offer a broad statement of the importance of openness in government:

Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the State, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this Section. This Section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, governmental subdivisions, units of local government, and special districts; and every office, board, commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.

The bill contains an analogous statement with respect to government meetings.

The amendment would fortify these statements of principle by requiring supermajority votes in both chambers of the North Carolina General Assembly -- 2/3 majorities -- to enact new restrictions on access to public records and official meetings.

Passage of this bill should be a priority for all legislators who earnestly believe Justice Louis Brandeis's famous observation that "sunshine is said to be the best of disinfectants."  As co-sponsor Rep. Moore observed, “Open access to information is critical to any democracy.  People have a right to know, and this protects that right.

If the amendment passes the North Carolina House and Senate, it would be placed on the ballot in 2012.  

Fourth Circuit Upholds Right to Publish Government Documents Containing SSNs

I’m going to devote a few posts over the next several weeks to some intriguing cases from 2010 that you might have missed.

One such case is a fascinating decision from the Fourth Circuit, Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263 (2010), in which the Court found a Virginia statute making it unlawful to intentionally publish a person’s social security number over the Internet violated the First Amendment. Judge Duncan’s thoughtful and thorough analysis offers insight into how the Supreme Court’s holdings in Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing, and The Florida Star v. B.J.F., all hallowed First Amendment decisions affirming the right to publish freely available public information, ought to be applied in a digital age fraught with the risk of identity theft and intrusions upon personal privacy.

The plaintiff in Ostergren is a privacy advocate. One way in which she has chosen to spread her message is by publishing on her web site public land records that reveal the social security numbers of various public officials. Virginia began placing its land records online in the 1990s. Initially, clerks of court did nothing to redact social security numbers from these records. Subsequently, the Virginia legislature required attorneys who filed instruments for recordation to ensure that social security numbers were removed before filing.

In 2007, the legislature addressed the redaction of records already available online (original land records maintained in hard copy form are not redacted). However, the record in the case demonstrated that there is an approximately 3% error rate in the redaction process, which means that even after the process is complete, over a million online records can be expected to contain unredacted social security numbers. By 2008, 105 of Virginia’s 120 counties had completed the redaction process; those that had not finished continued to make all records available online.

Ostergren began advocating for reform in 2003 when she created her web site, and two years later she began her practice of publishing unredacted documents on that site. The controversy sparked by her web site led to the amendment of Section 59.1-443.2, which prohibited the intentional communication of a person’s social security number, to remove the exception for “records required by law to be open to the public.” After the Virginia Attorney General announced his intention to prosecute Ostergren under the amended statute, Ostergren brought suit under Section 1983, seeking to have the law declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment as applied to her publication of copies of public records lawfully obtained from the government.

The district court ruled in Ostergren’s favor and entered an injunction. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s core holding under the First Amendment, while modifying the scope of its injunction.

The Fourth Circuit began by rejecting the categorical approach advanced by Virginia that social security numbers are unprotected speech that may be prohibited entirely. The Court held that “[g]iven her criticism about how public records are managed, we cannot see how drawing attention to the problem by displaying those very documents could be considered unprotected speech. Indeed, the Supreme Court has deemed such speech particularly valuable within our society.”

The Fourth Circuit then considered what level of scrutiny to apply to the Virginia statute’s regulation of protected speech. After a lengthy discussion of Cox Broadcasting, Daily Mail Publishing, and The Florida Star, the Court concluded that those decisions

make clear that Ostergren’s constitutional challenge must be evaluated using the Daily Mail standard. Accordingly, Virginia may enforce section 59.1-443.2 against Ostergren for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information about a matter of public significance ‘only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.’

Thus, strict scrutiny applied.

The Court then discussed the state’s interest protecting the disclosure of social security numbers. After providing an extensive history of the development of social security numbers and the risk of their misuse, the Court concluded that “Virginia’s asserted interest in protecting individual privacy by limiting SSNs’ public disclosure may certainly constitute ‘a state interest of the highest order.’” However, the Court went on to hold that it need not decide the question because it concluded, in any event, that Virginia’s restriction at issue was not narrowly tailored to the asserted interest.

In examining the question of narrow tailoring, the Court noted that the case involved a different conception of privacy than that present in Cox Broadcasting and The Florida Star. Those cases proceeded from a notion of privacy premised on secrecy, namely shielding from public view the fact that one had been the victim of rape. In Ostergren, on the other hand, secrecy was not at issue in the sense that a person is not embarrassed or humiliated, nor is their reputation harmed, by the revelation of his social security number. Instead, the privacy concern rests on ensuring proper use of and control over sensitive information, that if one’s social security number is revealed, unscrupulous persons may use the number for identity theft, bank fraud, and so on.

The Court noted another difference from the Cox Broadcasting and The Florida Star cases in that in those cases the disclosure was unintentional and could easily have been prevented. In Ostergren, the Fourth Circuit noted that it is much more difficult to ensure that not one of the millions of land records placed online contain an unredacted social security number.

Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that Virginia’s prohibition was not narrowly tailored to its asserted interest. In particular, the Court found that while the First Amendment does not necessarily require that each and every original land record be redacted before Ostergren may be prohibited from publishing them online in unredacted form,

the First Amendment does not allow Virginia to punish Ostergren for posting its land records online without redacting SSNs when numerous clerks are doing precisely that. . . . Virginia could curtail SSNs’ public disclosure much more narrowly by directing clerks not to make land records available through secure remote access until after SSNs have been redacted.

The court noted further that when documents with social security numbers slipped through the redaction process unaltered, “we leave open whether under such circumstances the Due Process Clause would not preclude Virginia from enforcing section 59.1-443.2 without first giving Ostergren adequate notice that the error had been corrected.”

On the strength of this sound analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that enforcement of Section 59.1-443.2 against Ostergren for posting the Virginia land records on her website would violate the First Amendment.

However, the Court went on to vacate the injunction entered by the district court on the grounds that its scope was both too narrow and too broad in certain respects. First, the Court rejected Ostergren’s argument that the injunction should protect her publication of non-Virginia public records that she had posted on her web site. Second, the Court found the injunction was too narrow in that it applied only to Virginia land records of public officials and did not include those of private individuals. Third, the injunction failed to cover Virginia land records posted by Ostergren concerning non-Virginia public officials.

To my knowledge, this is the first case to examine this issue. Look for more disputes to arise under the Cox Broadcasting/Daily Mail Publishing/The Florida Star line of cases as concern over privacy continue to clash with the public interest, embodied in the First Amendment, to permit the publication of publicly available government records.

Criminal Defendant Denied Access to Reality Show Footage

A trial court judge in Charlotte ruled Thursday that a defendant in a murder case is not entitled to unaired footage from the A&E series The First 48.  The case presented an interesting twist on shield law issues.

Jonathan Fitzgerald has been charged with the murder of Oscar Alvarado Chavez, who was stabbed to death in his car in August 2010 in Charlotte.  The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department has entered into a contract with the producers of The First 48 to give the show access to officers investigating homicides.  The premise of the show is that if a suspect is not identified within the first 48 hours after a crime is committed, the likelihood of solving the crime drops precipitously.

The First 48 devoted one of its episodes to the CMPD's investigation of Chavez's murder, including the ultimate arrest of Fitzgerald.  In the course of the criminal case against Fitzgerald, which is still pending, Fitzgerald requested that the district attorney produce all unaired video footage captured in connection with the production of the episode.  His attorney argued that because the CMPD had the right under its contract with the producers to review a rough cut of the episode before it aired, the producers were operating essentially as an agent or investigator of the police department.  This, the attorney argued, meant the footage constituted part of the file that the defendant was entitled to review under the open file discovery rules in criminal cases.

This approach, of course, allowed the attorney to sidestep North Carolina's shield law, which requires parties who subpoena journalists to pass a rigorous three-part test before they can obtain material.  We've previously written about shield laws here.  Thus, the case presented two interesting issues.  First, whether the unaired material was in the possession of the district attorney's office for purposes of the criminal discovery statute.  If not, the next question was whether the show's producers constituted journalists for purposes of the shield statute and, if so, whether Fitzgerald could overcome the qualified privilege against production.

I discussed this issue with WFAE reporter Julie Rose before the court issued its ruling.  As her report indicates, my own view was that because the contact made clear that the footage was the property of the producers of the show, Fitzgerald should not be able to obtain the material from the district attorney.  As to the application of the shield statute, my view was that the producers of a television show of this nature -- which focused on the activities of local law enforcement in investigating an actual high-profile crime -- fit within the broad definition of a "journalist" under North Carolina's shield statute.

It appears that the judge who heard the issue was likewise skeptical of Fitzgerald's attempt to tie the television show producers to the district attorney's office.  According to the report of his ruling in the News & Observer, Judge Eric Levinson ruled that the shield statute applied and that Fitzgerald was not entitled to the footage because he could not demonstrate that it was essential to his defense of the case.

Blue Language Given Thumbs Up in North Carolina

Sorry, this blog post is not about the Duke-UNC rivalry.  Instead, it is about a First Amendment decision handed down by a trial judge last month that qualifies as being on the lighter, if not cleaner, side.  The case involved North Carolina's antiquated -- and quirky -- anti-profanity statute.  The 98-year old statute made it a crime to utter profanity on a public highway, but with two of North Carolina's 100 counties exempted -- Pitt County in the east and Swain County in the west.

Judge Allen Baddour ruled in January that Samantha Elabanjo could not be prosecuted for a misdemeanor under the statute for using the word "damn" during a run-in with police officers (apparently as part of her assessment of the cleanliness of the officers' police cruiser).  N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-197 reads in its entirety:

If any person shall, on any public road or highway and in the hearing of two or more persons, in a loud and boisterous manner, use indecent or profane language, he shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. The following counties shall be exempt from the provisions of this section: Pitt and Swain.

The trial court reached the sensible and straightforward conclusion that the law is unconstitutionally vague under the First Amendment because of the lack of clarity as to what currently constitutes "indecent or profane language."

The more interesting question, one that vexed the Associated Press reporter who penned the article linked above, is why Pitt and Swain Counties were exempted.  Apparently when the law was adopted, the legislators in their wisdom concluded that there needed to be places of refuge in which highwaygoers could let their tongues fly and the expletives rip.  This approach later sparked one of the more memorable speeches on the floor of the North Carolina legislature, Representative Herbert Hyde's "cursing" speech.

In his impassioned defense of retaining two cursing sanctuaries in the state, Rep. Hyde stated the following, apparently after first acknowledging that the law was likely unconstitutional:

But the folks in Swain wouldn't want me to stand on that kind of technicality and I'm not going to do that.

. . .

But there ought to be a refuge somewhere a man could go and when he really is provoked that he can say something with impunity.  There's only two places left Pitt and Swain. One in the East and one in the West. I think it's most appropriate.

The link above contains the entire speech.

N.C. Court of Appeals Upholds Courtroom Access in Family Law Dispute

The North Carolina Court of Appeals earlier this week made an important statement in favor of courtroom access, affirming a lower court ruling that had declined to close proceedings in a family law dispute.  The decision, in the case of France v. France, was significant in that the parties had sought to close proceedings on the basis of a confidentiality provision in a separation agreement.

The parties to the case entered into a separation agreement in 2007, which contained various confidentiality provisions.  One obligated the parties to "use their best efforts so that any reference to the terms of th[e] Agreement and the Agreement itself will be filed under seal" if any litigation ensued between them.  A year later, Brian France sued his former wife Megan France, contending she had violated certain terms of the agreement.  In bringing the action, Mr. France obtained a court order permitting him to file the complaint under seal and requiring future pleadings likewise to be placed under seal.

Mr. France later moved for a preliminary injunction in September 2009, and the parties jointly requested that the court close the hearing on the motion.  The trial judge denied the motion to close, as well as Mr. France's motion for preliminary injunction.  Mr. France appealed the denial of the closure motion.  Thereafter, a local newspaper and television station moved under North Carolina's access statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-72.1, to have the pleadings on file unsealed, a motion the trial court granted.  Mr. France then appealed the unsealing order as well.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals made short work of Mr. France's second appeal, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the unsealing order because Mr. France's first appeal divested the court of jurisdiction under the doctrine of "functus officio."  This rigid application of the doctrine is troubling because the unsealing order did not relate to the subject matter of the first appeal, as it involved the status of the pleadings on file and future hearings, but not the closure of the preliminary injunction hearing.  The first appeal, of course, was from an interlocutory order and did not involve the ultimate merits of the case.  It is unclear how the court's application of the doctrine in this fashion advances judicial efficiency since it suggests that any proper interlocutory appeal -- such as one on a narrow privilege issue -- forces the entire case to come to a screeching halt while the appeal proceeds.

Nonetheless, the court's ruling on Mr. France's first appeal represents a clear victory for courtroom access.  In upholding the trial court's closure order, the court rejected Mr. France's argument that a confidentiality clause in a private contract automatically overrides a citizen's right to access civil court proceedings.  As the court observed, Article I, Section 18 of North Carolina's Constitution specifically provides that the courts shall be open.  Accordingly, Mr. France bore the burden of overcoming this presumption of openness by demonstrating how the public's right to open proceedings was outweighed by a countervailing private interest.

The contract provision alone was not enough to meet this requirement -- Mr. France was required to "show some independent countervailing public policy concern sufficient to outweigh the qualified right of access to civil court proceedings."  Nor was it sufficient to argue, as Mr. France did, that matters related to the Frances' minor child were at issue -- the court had other, narrower means at its disposal to protect the privacy interests of the minor than closing the proceeding in its entirety.  Finally, the court found no basis for closing the proceeding simply because the agreement itself, which contained a confidentiality provision, would be discussed.

In short, the decision stands as an important reminder that the parties cannot simply agree to litigate their disputes in private (unless they chose private arbitration).  By using the court system --  a public resource in the broadest sense -- to resolve their dispute, the parties should not be heard to complain if third parties wish to observe how their dispute is resolved.