U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Limits on Corporate Political Speech on First Amendment Grounds

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that corporations (and labor unions) may make unlimited expenditures to directly advocate for the election or defeat of a Federal candidate at any point in the election cycle.  The crux of the Court’s decision is that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from banning certain types of political speech based on the corporate identity of the speaker. The decision opens the way for greatly increased participation by corporations—large and small, for-profit and non-profit—in the election process.

Prior to yesterday’s decision, federal law, as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA,” informally referred to as the McCain-Feingold law), prohibited corporations and labor unions from purchasing ads that either expressly advocate the election or defeat of a Federal candidate or amount to an “electioneering communication”—that is, a communication that (1) “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office,” (2) is made within 30 days of a primary election or within 60 days of a general election, and (3) is publicly distributed.  Since BCRA, corporations and labor unions have been permitted to engage in express advocacy and electioneering communications only through their political action committees (PACs).

The Supreme Court previously upheld the ban on corporate electioneering communications in 2003 in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, relying on its holding in an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, that restrictions on corporate political speech are permissible in light of the Government’s interest in preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” by corporations.

In January 2008, Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, released a documentary entitled “Hillary: The Movie” about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary. Citizens United wished to make the documentary available through video-on-demand service within 30 days of the 2008 primary elections but feared that the film (and a series of three advertisements encouraging viewers to purchase the film through the on-demand service) would trigger the BCRA ban on electioneering communications because the film and ads “referred to” a Presidential candidate.  Citizens United sued in federal court seeking a declaration that the BCRA ban on electioneering communications is unconstitutional.  After a three-judge panel of the federal district court denied Citizens United’s requests for relief, Citizens United sought review in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, yesterday held that “[t]he Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.”  In so holding, the Court overruled Austin (which allowed the Government to restrict corporate political speech) and invalidated BCRA’s ban on electioneering communications.  Citizens United reflects the Court’s adherence to the principle that the Government cannot suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.

Beginning with the premise that BCRA erects an outright ban on core political speech by corporations and unions, the Court applied “strict scrutiny” to the ban, requiring the Government to demonstrate that the law furthers a compelling interest.  The BCRA ban did not withstand that scrutiny: the Court found “no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers,” including corporations.

The Court addressed and rejected all three “interests” proposed by the Government to support the electioneering communications ban: (1) the “anti-distortion” theory adopted by Austin, (2) an interest in preventing corruption, and (3) and an interest in protecting “dissenting shareholders.”

The Court first declared that First Amendment protections cannot turn on a speaker’s financial ability (that is, “immense aggregations” of corporate wealth) to engage in political speech.  On that point, the majority was particularly troubled by the prospect that the anti-distortion rationale for the BCRA ban could be used to prohibit political speech by media corporations, which are currently exempted from the ban on electioneering communications.  The Court likewise rejected the anti-corruption rationale because independent expenditures simply do not present the same risk of quid pro quo corruption (or the appearance of corruption) as do direct contributions to candidates and parties.  And it rejected the shareholder protection rationale—that shareholders should not be compelled to fund corporate political speech with which they disagree—as both underinclusive (because the statute only bans some corporate speech at certain times) and overinclusive (because it applies even to single-shareholder corporations).

The Court concluded that “the First Amendment does not permit Congress to make categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.”  With Austin thus set aside, the Court rejected the ban on corporate independent expenditures (for both electioneering communications and for express advocacy), because the law’s “purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”  Given the primacy of political speech in our representative democracy, the Court said, “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it.”

The Court did not go so far as to strike down the BCRA disclaimer and disclosure requirements.  In the Court’s view, while more political speech enhances the political process, that speech should be transparent, so that the public can better evaluate the political message and the potential bias of the speaker.

The Citizens United decision is breathtaking in scope.

First, the content of political expenditures by corporations and unions is no longer at issue, because corporations and unions are no longer limited to engaging in so-called “issue advocacy.” Rather, they may now purchase advertising that includes a direct appeal to vote for or against a Federal candidate.  The distinction between “issue” and “express” advocacy by corporations and unions—which has muddled campaign finance law for so long—is dissolved.

Second, the timing of political expenditures by corporations and unions is no longer at issue.  After the Supreme Court held that corporate and union political expenditures are no longer limited to issue advocacy, it also struck down the BCRA prohibition on “electioneering communications”—and, with it, the 30- and 60-day windows that governed corporate political ads.  As a result, the Supreme Court’s test for distinguishing between permissible and prohibited electioneering communications articulated in 2007 in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life is already a relic of campaign finance law.

Third, the number of entities that benefit from the decision is enormous.  The decision applies to all corporations and unions regardless of size or tax status.  This means that both traditional for-profit corporations and tax-exempt political organizations—e.g., Section 527 organizations such as Moveon.org and Club for Growth—may make unlimited political expenditures to expressly advocate for the election or defeat of a Federal candidate.

Fourth, the Court’s reasoning calls into question similar campaign finance laws enacted by nearly half the States.

Yesterday’s ruling does not, however, alter the longstanding bar on direct corporate contributions to federal political candidates. Corporations and unions continue to be prohibited from making contributions to federal candidates from their general treasuries.
 

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The Citizens United decision has already generated a massive volume of commentary, some positive, some negative.  President Obama, for his part, has vowed to "develop a forceful response" to the decision, which he asserted gives "a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our politics."  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce hailed the ruling, stating that it "protects the First Amendment rights of organizations across the political spectrum, and is a positive for the political process and free enterprise."

As the Court itself acknowledged, the decision undoubtedly ushers in a new era of campaign finance in America, namely pairing corporate independent expenditures with disclosure requirements.  It remains to be seen whether Congress will make a renewed effort to limit participation in the political process by corporations.

Hagan Drops Political Ad Lawsuit; Coleman Suit Dismissed

In a prior post, we reported upon the institution of legal actions in the midst of two high-profile U.S. Senate campaigns.  There were important developments in both matters yesterday.

As we reported, Kay Hagan instituted an action over a political ad run by North Carolina incumbent Elizabeth Dole.  Hagan, who ultimately won the race, filed a document in North Carolina state court contending that Dole's ad contained defamatory statements about her.  Yesterday, Hagan filed papers with the court dismissing her claim.

In Minnesota, incumbent Norm Coleman filed suit over a political ad run by his challenger, Al Franken.  The race for Coleman's seat remains uncalled, with Coleman maintaining a razor-thin 206 vote lead as the recount process begins.  Yesterday, an administrative law judge in Minnesota entered an order dismissing Coleman's complaint, a decision she reached after conducting a probable cause hearing on November 7, 2008.

In the order, the judge ultimately concluded that there "is not probable cause to believe [Franken] violated Minn. Stat. s. 211B.06," which prohibits a person from disseminating a false political advertisement that the person knows is false or is reckless as to its truth.  The decision examined a statement in the ad that Coleman had been "ranked the fourth most corrupt Senator in Washington" by an organization called the "Center for Responsibility and Ethics in Government,"   (The administrative law judge had previously concluded that another statement Coleman challenged, that he is "living almost rent free in a million dollar home of a Washington insider," fell outside the purview of the statute because it constituted opinion and could not be proved true or false).

The statement at issue was drawn from report prepared by the organization that named "the 20 most corrupt members of Congress."  The report also named four "dishonorable mentions," a list that included Coleman.  The list of twenty included three Senators, and Coleman was the only Senator among the "dishonorable mentions."  Neither list included numerals or any numbering scheme.  Coleman contended the statement in the ad that he was the "fourth most corrupt Senator" was false because he was not included on the organization's list of "20 most corrupt" members of Congress.  Coleman also pointed to a statement from the executive director of the organization that her group does not actually rank the persons on the list.  In response, Franken contended the statement was true because, as the executive director acknowledged, "96 other senators did not make the list at all."  Coleman also challenged the ad's characterization of the organization as a "bipartisan watchdog group," contending the group instead was "liberal leaning."

In concluding that Coleman had failed to establish probable cause of a statutory violation, the judge found the statement in the ad to be "substantially accurate, if not literally true in every detail."  According to the judge

[B]ased on the reference in CREW's Executive Summary to the 'list of 24,' there is an objective basis for the inference drawn in the Franken advertisement that Senator Coleman was the fourth Senator on the overall list of 24.

The judge also rejected Coleman's claim with respect to the characterization of CREW as a "bipartisan watchdog organization" on the grounds that it did not relate to the personal or political character of Coleman and, in any event, it constituted a non-actionable statement of opinion.  Given her conclusion that Coleman had failed to demonstrate the ad contained an actionably false statement about Coleman, it was unnecessary for her to address whether Franken acted recklessly or with knowledge of falsity.

Coleman has the right to seek reconsideration of the decision.

 

Legal Actions Initiated over Political Ads in High-Profile Senate Races

Not even two weeks after we highlighted the issue of defamation claims arising from political ads, those very claims are making headlines right now in two high-profile political races.

Just this week, two United States Senate candidates—Minnesota incumbent Norm Coleman and North Carolina challenger Kay Hagan—have instituted legal action against their political opponents over alleged defamation in political ads.

The subject of Coleman’s suit against challenger Al Franken is a political ad claming that Coleman was “ranked the fourth most corrupt Senator in Washington” and that he was "living almost rent-free in the million-dollar home of a Washington insider."  As we discussed in a prior post, claims that a politician is "corrupt" or has been involved in "corruption" have been the subject of other litigation.

Kay Hagan's legal action involves a political ad run by incumbent Elizabeth Dole.  In the papers Hagan filed in court, she contends the ad "falsely implies that [Hagan] shares the views of an entity that calls itself the Godless Americans PAC."  Hagan also takes issue with the way the ad ends, which includes an image of Hagan while a voiceover from someone apparently associated with the PAC states "There is no God."  Hagan contends that this depiction "implies it is [Hagan's] voice and her statement."  Prior to institution of a legal action, Hagan aired an ad of her own responding to Dole's ad. 

In response to a "cease and desist" letter from Hagan's attorneys that preceded the legal action, attorneys representing Dole defended the accuracy and legality of the ad and indicated that Dole would not pull it, contending that the ad "plainly states facts."  Dole has moved to dismiss Hagan's action, and she has run a new ad on the same topic.

We will follow the progress of these lawsuits.  Because both ads were candidate ads, the television stations that aired them were provided immunity from liability under federal law.  However, these lawsuits serve as further reminders that political ads can give rise to litigation.

Beware as Charges of "Corruption" Fly in Political Advertisements

With two weeks left in a hotly contested election season, the airwaves and newspapers are jammed full of political ads supporting (or attacking) one candidate or another.  These ads make for great political fodder, but they can also present knotty issues for broadcasters and newspapers to consider in deciding what to run and what not to run, especially as the ads become more negative in the late days of the campaign.

With negativity comes the possibility of defamation liability, especially when the target of the negative ad ends up losing the election.  While broadcasters enjoy immunity from liability for ads sponsored by candidates for state or federal office, there is no such protection for so-called "issue" ads sponsored by persons other than candidates, by political parties or by third-party interest groups.  Newspapers have no such immunity at all.  This means for political ads other than candidate ads broadcast over the air, broadcasters and newspapers are potentially on the hook for defamatory statements contained in the ads they run.

Generally speaking, as the California Supreme Court has said, “short of accusations of crime or personal dishonesty, the First Amendment protects even sharp attacks on the character, motives, or moral qualifications” of a public official, which includes candidates for elective office.  But political ads don’t always stop short of those kinds of accusations.  In fact, ads linking a candidate, either directly or implicitly, to illegal activity or to political corruption are not uncommon.

The first thing to remember is that if an accusation contained in an ad is true, you cannot be liable for defamation.  So when you are asked to place such an ad, ask for backup that supports the statements accusing the candidate of illegal activity or corruption.  Also be mindful that any person or company mentioned in the ad other than the candidates themselves may be a potential defamation plaintiff.  Ask for backup as to any potentially defamatory statements made about them as well.  (Public officials will also have to show that you acted with a high degree of fault in airing the advertisement--the famous "actual malice" standard--but that is the subject for another post).

It may well be the case that statements made in an aggressive ad are neither clearly true nor demonstrably false, such as “Senator X is the most corrupt politician in the legislature.”  Is the proper response, “Corruption is an opinion, and since I (or someone) truly hold (or holds) that opinion, it cannot be a false statement.”  Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court foreclosed that argument in the case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal.  The Court held: “If a speaker says, ‘In my opinion John Jones is a liar,’ he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth.”  That implication is enough to support liability for defamation.

As for the underlying charge of corruption or illegality, the rule in almost every jurisdiction in the country is that a false statement that accuses someone of committing a crime or that “tends to injure the plaintiff in his or her trade, business or profession” is libel per se.  So, for example, when one candidate for mayor of a town in New Jersey distributed flyers that said that his opponent’s “corruption will bring increase in 1990 taxes,” the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the statement was defamatory.  In that case, however, there was clear evidence that the deal in question was not illegal or corrupt because a state investigative commission had cleared the mayor of any wrongdoing.  Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a libel verdict against a talk show host who had repeatedly accused a judge of being corrupt because the evidence at trial showed those statements to be verifiably false.

The rub is that an implicit accusation of "corruption" may be hard to prove true or false.  The question you have to answer, then, is how close to the line you want to walk as a news operation.  The simplest rule to follow is the more directly an ad accuses someone of corruption or illegal activity, the more concrete evidence supporting that accusation you should require before running the ad.  The stakes are too high to be less careful—the judge in the Texas case above was initially awarded compensatory and punitive damages totaling $8 million.