Defamation in 140 Characters or Fewer

The Twitter phenomena has seemingly gone viral this summer. What started out as a quirky way for people to send brief (140 characters or fewer!!) updates on their daily activities, thoughts, or opinions, is now a major source of breaking news. From the streets of Iran to the Pittsburgh Steelers’ practice field, correspondents of all stripes are Tweeting first, blogging second, and (maybe) writing a story for the crusty old newspaper third.

It should come as no surprise, then, that we are just now seeing our first claims for Twitter defamation.  As has been widely discussed, a Chicago area real estate company has sued a former tenant for defamation based on a Tweet (that is, a message sent via Twitter) she sent to her 20 followers. The Tweet said “You should just come anyway. Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment is bad for you? Horizon Realty thinks it’s okay.” Horizon is seeking $50,000 in damages based on harm to the company’s business reputation.

While commentary on the suit has focused on the company’s perhaps overly litigious approach to what was at most a very minor annoyance, the suit does raise some interesting legal issues.

First, the fact that the Tweet only went to 20 readers may be legally significant to the issue of how much Horizon’s reputation was really harmed, but it does not make the words any less defamatory. All Horizon would need to show is that the post went to even one third party.

The harder question is whether the Tweet was, in fact, defamatory. Does the Tweet accuse Horizon of maintaining moldy apartments as a matter of fact, or is it simply opinion or commentary not intended to be interpreted as a statement of fact? The former is actionable (unless it is true, of course), the latter is probably not.  The ultimate answer to that question is less important, for our purposes, than the fact that it is a close legal question that is not going to be dismissed easily or cheaply.

While this lawsuit raises more chuckles than anything else, it should give pause to reporters, editors, and publishers of all varieties. Twitter is meant to be an intimate kind of affair—readers getting an insider’s view of someone’s day-to-day existence, for better or for worse. This intimacy, and the short-hand nature of the medium itself, breeds an informality that can be very dangerous for reporters and others with a lot of subscribers and a high profile. When your White House correspondent Tweets about a breaking news event, thousands of readers may be seeing that message, a message that was not edited, not vetted, and probably not even seen by anyone other than the reporter before it went out. That problem is exacerbated by the fact that many blogs and other news organizations now pick up and re-publish Tweets from high-profile reporters (and, yes, politicians).

Again, that level of intimacy and immediacy is what makes Twitter popular, but it should give newsrooms heartburn as well. The bottom line is that you can easily defame someone in 140 characters or fewer, but even the best lawyer in the world can’t draft a successful motion to dismiss that short.

N.C. Bill Aimed at Curbing Defamatory Internet Content

 A bill introduced this session in the North Carolina General Assembly would take the regulation of speech on the Internet in a troubling new direction.  Indeed, the negative response to Senate Bill 46, introduced by Senator Steve Goss, has spanned the political spectrum, ranging from North Carolina's Civitas Institute, which termed it the "bad bill of the week," to the BlueNC blog.  The bill has several components.

First, the bill would criminalize defamatory statement made over the Internet.  In particular, the bill declares it to be "unlawful for any person to communicate by transmission through an electronic medium any false, defamatory statement that is libelous or slanderous."  The offense would be punishable as a Class 2 misdemeanor and, notably, the State of North Carolina would have jurisdiction "if the transmission that constitutes the offense either originates in the State or is received or viewed in the State."  The bill defines "electronic medium" to include "the Internet and any computerized or electronic information service," including "a bulletin board, a network, an online service, electronic mail, a forum, a blog, or a news group."

Thus, as drafted, the bill would create a new class of criminal libel in North Carolina.  In response to criticism of this move -- particularly given that states have generally moved away from criminal libel statutes and those with criminal libel statutes on the books (such as North Carolina) generally have let them lie fallow -- Senator Goss apparently told local press outlets in North Carolina that the inclusion of criminal penalties in the bill was "an oversight."  There is a serious question whether the enforcement of criminal libel statutes would violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the wake of the New York Times v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana cases.

Second, a particularly troubling aspect of the bill appears in subsection (e) of section 2.  It provides:

The person who administers or provides the facilities for the electronic medium involved in the alleged libel or slander shall not be held liable for the alleged libel or slander unless the person is guilty of negligence either in allowing the material to be placed in the electronic medium or in allowing the material to remain in the electronic medium after the person became aware that the material was false and defamatory.

This provision would make websites and web hosts liable for third-party content if they were found "negligent" in allowing a defamatory statement to be posted or to remain posted after a complaint or some other form of notice was received.  This effort to hold website operators responsible for third-party content runs headlong into Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a federal statute that expressly provides that websites and web hosts are not responsible for defamatory or most other actionable content (the prime exception being posts amounting to copyright violations) created by third-party users.  So long as the website operator -- or "interactive service provider" -- is not deemed an "information content provider" with respect to the statement at issue, the website operator cannot be treated as the publisher of the statement for liability purposes.

Congress passed Section 230 in an effort to encourage website operators to police content on their sites without running the risk of being held responsible for objectionable content they miss.  Senate Bill 46 would turn that approach on its head by creating an incentive for website operators not to learn about objectionable posts made to their blogs or message boards.  Because of this direct conflict with Section 230, this provision of Senate Bill 46 would be preempted and unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution.

Third, Senate Bill 46 would make significant changes to North Carolina's retraction statute.  The second section of the bill would require a plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in response to defamatory material conveyed through an electronic medium first to give notice to the person accused of making the statement and then to allow that person 5 days to correct the statement at issue and post an apology.  The request could be made through traditional means or "by placing the request at one of the locations in the electronic medium known . . . where the libelous or slanderous material was placed."  Once the person receives the notice, he or she must post the apology and correction within 10 days, to the extent possible, in the same location and for the same time period that the challenged statement was posted.

If a trier of fact concludes that the statement at issue was made in good faith, was due to an "honest mistake," was posted without the prior knowledge or approval of the person "who administers the facilities for the electronic medium," or, even if the post was made with approval of the administrator, there were "reasonable grounds for believing that the communications were true" and a timely correction and apology is posted in compliance with the statute, then the plaintiff would be limited in the lawsuit to recovery of his or her actual damages.

A final note worthy of mention is that the changes to the retraction statute and the proposed liability for negligent website operators "shall not apply to anonymous communications."  This provision creates a questionable incentive -- website operators would be protected from the section's liability so long they require users to post content anonymously, a move unlikely to inspire restraint among would-be Internet defamers.

In short, Senate Bill 46 as drafted is problematic in a number of ways.  It appears to run afoul of both Constitutional and federal law, and the incentives it would create would likely do little to accomplish the stated objectives of the bill's sponsors, namely to reduce defamatory content in emails, message board posts, and blogs.  Nevertheless, the introduction of Senate Bill 46 in North Carolina is a signal that state legislatures may become more active in attempting to curb what they view as the excesses of Internet speech.  Because many news organizations operate websites that allow users to post content, the news media across the country should be on the lookout for analogues to this bill in their own states.